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Abstract. This article describes psychological issues in assessing the viability of sanctions before they are
affected and then evaluating the consequences of these sanctions.
The United Nations (UN) Security Council has recently been debating the viability of sanctions in
achieving objectives desired by the UN. One common concern is that leaders of governments of
countries experiencing sanctions are the ones who most often can change behavior in a manner desired
by the UN, but masses of people within these countries with little or no effect on target behavior bear
the noxious brunt of sanctions. Another common concern is that sanctions can very easily be construed
as violations of national sovereignty perpetrated by a Western controlled, globally hegemonic Security
Council led by the United States as superpower or hyperpower.
However, there are more specific and psychological issues bearing on the value of sanctions. One issue
is how the sanction is functionally perceived by the target. Here functional perception denotes how the
sanction is construed as some combination of positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, omission
training, or punishment yielding some cumulative consequence that is either desired or undesired by
the target. Due to mirror imaging and just plain misperception by the Security Council about the
character of the target, expected (by the Council) noxiousness of sanctions may be experienced as
anything but by the target. For example, sanctions lowering the health status of a people may buy a
targeted government very significant political support as to the matter eliciting Council sanctions or as
to the legitimacy of Council sanctions in this matter or in any matter.
Another issue is the uncertainty in behavioral consequence stemming from punishment. Although
punishment is almost always applied as a vehicle to decrease the frequency and intensity of undesired
behavior, the consequence may yield no change or even an increase in behavioral frequency and
intensity.
A more abstruse but very germane issue is that the very behaviorist jargon that has permeated common
parlance and--ironically--cognition is imbued with circular associations. For example, positive
reinforcement is what increases the intensity and/or frequency of behavior. But how can one choose
what constitutes positive reinforcement until after the consequences of what one chooses?
Unfortunately, one must choose a priori. One might counter that one chooses from a history of prior
linkages between what seems to have qualified as positive reinforcement and specific consequences.
However, each social situation within which behavior and consequences occur surely is unique in many
ways. Whether this uniqueness suggests relevance for expected consequences is again a problematic
call. And the same sort of analysis can be developed for negative reinforcement and omission training.
As to consequences, the Security Council debate on sanctions will most likely be inconsequential. This is
because the debate focuses too closely on political issues and too rarely--if at all--on the philosophical
and conceptual underpinnings of a political tool. Perhaps the Council should face sanctions for their
debating shortfalls? (See Crossette, B. (April 18, 2000). U.N. Council to review its policy on sanctions. The
New York Times, p. A10; Feeley, T. H., & deTurck, M. A. (1998). The behavioral correlates of sanctioned
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and unsanctioned deceptive communication. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 22, 189-204; Kaplan, H. B.,
& Damphousse, K. R. (1997). Negative social sanctions, self-derogation, and deviant behavior: Main and
interactive effects in longitudinal perspective. Deviant Behavior, 18, 1-26; Richardson, D.R., & Green, L.
R. (1999). Social sanction and threat explanations of gender effects on direct and indirect aggression.
Aggressive Behavior, 25, 425-434; Tenbrunsel, A. E., & Messick, D. M. (1999). Sanctioning systems,
decision frames, and cooperation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 684-707.) (Keywords: Sanction,
Security Council, United Nations.)
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